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 Abstract 
 
This study tests the hypothesis that bank liabilities and managed funds are 
close substitutes. Some literature associates the alleged decline in banking 
business with the disintermediation of banks’ traditional deposit-taking 
business in favour of investment management.  A comparative assessment 
of managed fund and bank deposit qualitative attributes fails to support 
substitutability. Using data on Australian bank-affiliated funds and a nine-
year record of bank liability balances, this study finds that, empirically, 
managed funds do not displace bank liabilities. Prudential capital adequacy 
requirements dissuade banks from using in-house managed investments as 
indirect conduits for raising funds in the same manner as deposit taking. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The phenomenal growth of the mutual and pension fund sectors has led to premature 
claims of a considerable decline in the role of banks in financial intermediation.  Consensus 
appears to be settling around a new theory of intermediation that recognises that banks have 
simply rearranged their business to offer new forms of intermediation that have emerged out 
of financial markets’ demand for additional services beyond the asset transformation aspect of 
intermediation. Allen and Santomero (1998 and 2001) have led the recent debate on the need 
to take risk management and the cutting of participation costs, for example, as important 
factors to consider in determining what intermediaries do. Adopting this understanding of 
intermediation allows for the acceptance of the notion that the business of banking, under a 
strong challenge from financial market participants such as mutual funds, is being redefined 
to encompass such non-traditional activities.  
 
The motivation for this paper is that in the current era of the transformation of 
intermediation, no explicit microeconomic evidence has been produced on the substitutability 
of bank liabilities and mutual fund products. Yet banking literature is strewn with indirect 
references to the existence of the phenomenon. Gallo et al (1996) contend, with reference to 
the late 1980s and early 1990s in the US, that declining interest rate levels prompted a shift in 
household savings from traditional bank deposits to mutual funds. This shift is alleged to have 
pushed banks, fearful of disintermediation, into the mutual fund business.1 Commenting on 
the question of the indispensability or otherwise of commercial banks, Scott (1998) asserts 
that savings and time deposits at banks might be under threat as mutual funds become an 
alternative for the current payment system. This view extends a trend, triggered off by the 
rapid growth of alternatives to traditional intermediaries, that associates investment managers 
with “banks of the future” (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1993).  
 
Kane (1995) stands out in challenging the market-centric cliché of the disintermediation 
of bank deposits by querying why banks, faced with competition for deposits from mutual 
funds, have not simply structured products that offer mutual fund-like payoffs instead of 
establishing costly fully-fledged mutual fund subsidiaries. Kane concludes that it is the 
inapplicability of deposit insurance requirements to bank-affiliated mutual funds in the US, 
not-withstanding the credit enhancement implied in their association with the banks, that has 
provided banks with an incentive to form mutual fund operations instead of index-linked 
deposit products. Kane points to Australia where, by the mid-1990s, at least one major bank 
was developing such an index-linked offering against a background of the non-existence of 
deposit insurance. However, as it has turned out since then, although more banks have 
developed index-linked deposit products, they have also taken part in the frenetic mergers and 
acquisition activity in the second half of the 1990s that has given the major banks large 
exposures to funds management business. 
 
These market developments have, however, not marked the death of Kane’s (1995) 
argument. In a case that might suggest that banks favour a definition of managed fund 
products as being close substitutes for bank deposits, Commonwealth Bank, one of the four 
largest banks in Australia, in its application for the approval of its merger with Colonial, a 
dominant funds management group, was reported to have unsuccessfully applied to the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Authority (ACCC) to have managed funds and trusts 
included in the market definition encompassing term deposits and transaction accounts 
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(Goddard and Walker, 2001).  The ACCC subsequently maintained separate definitions for 
the two product classes in the spirit of its traditional market definition process that identifies 
“all sources and potential sources of close substitutes for the merged firm’s products” as a 
prelude to a ruling on a merger proposal.2   
 
The apparent willingness by practitioners to treat bank products and mutual fund 
offerings as substitutes, compounded by a possible similar perception by depositors, may lead 
to funding problems for banking institutions. Mutual funds may be profitable business lines 
for banks, but the prudentially enforced principle of separation between the banking and funds 
management activities housed under a single corporate entity dictates funds raised this way 
are not equivalent to other forms of liabilities such as deposits. The seriousness of the issue is 
illustrated by the issuance of a warning in November 2001 by Standard and Poor’s that the 
funding pressures being faced by banks due, in part, to the waning of the traditional low-cost 
deposit base as customers increasingly shift towards higher yielding investment options such 
as managed funds, “could contribute incrementally to negative ratings sentiment in the 
Australian banking market”.3 
 
Contrary to the view encouraged by apparent investor shifts towards market based 
investment vehicles, the physical attributes of managed funds do not fully conform to their 
substitutability for bank products. Pilloff (1999) observes that, in spite of similarities in 
safety, liquidity, accessibility and convenience, the lack of absolute capital preservation 
guarantees, liquidity constraints and the continued dominance of bank accounts in household 
finances preclude a verdict of substitutability.  
 
This paper uses panel data on monthly bank liability balances over nine years and a 
dataset of managed funds covering nine years to quantitatively document the displacement or 
otherwise of bank investment-type liabilities by managed fund products. The paper that is 
closest to the present one in addressing the question of the closeness of money market 
oriented managed funds is Farinella and Koch (1999) that differentiates from a 
macroeconomic standpoint transactions and yield-based incentives for households to hold 
money market funds. The work conjectures that if the former incentives exceed the latter, and 
this is exhibited in actual household preferences, then money market funds would be 
considered close to money, and hence deposits and other savings products offered by banks. 
To this end, an analysis of the demand for taxable money market funds shows that the 
demand is positively related to fund yields but negatively related to the demand for 
competing, tax-exempt, funds and the long-term government bond yield. On the basis of this 
indirect evidence Farinella and Koch’s (1999) findings are mixed; they conclude that both 
transactions and yield motives exist.  
 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. The next section performs Pilloff’s (1999) 
descriptive analysis in the Australian context and develops a testable model for the 
displacement of banking products by managed fund products. Section 3 describes the data 
used in this paper and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 summarises and 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
  3 
   
2. Managed Fund—Bank Liability Substitutability 
2.1 A descriptive analysis 
 
This section assesses the substitutability of Australian bank-managed funds for bank 
liabilities in the context Pilloff’s (1999) descriptive framework, paraphrased here to consist of 
three main elements: (1) liquidity and accessibility, (2) safety and price stability, and (3) 
demand trends. Whilst Pilloff (1999) restricts the analysis to money market mutual funds 
(MMMFs), this paper adopts a broader scope by considering cash and fixed income funds in 
addition to cash management trusts (CMTs), the Australian equivalent of MMMFs. Figure 1 
summarises Pilloff’s major conclusions under the subheadings applied in this section. 
 
(i) Liquidity and Accessibility  
 
Although fund managers’ promotional literature routinely claims that they offer the 
convenience of bank-offered savings products, it is on this issue that Pilloff’s (1999) findings 
of the lack of substitution effects are found to most directly apply to the Australian context.  
 
Whilst liquidity and accessibility are available to a degree to managed fund investors, 
there are discrepancies that vary with fund types. For example, cash management trusts 
generally include access to deposit, cheque and online transactions offered by the parent bank 
but these will not be directly via the fund account. In fact CMTs are prohibited from 
accepting direct cash deposits and withdrawals, all transactions being by cheques drawn on an 
account held by the fund operator at a deposit-taking institution. Funds that offer a 
chequebook restrict the denomination of the transaction amounts, usually to $500 lots.  
 
Ease of entry is a major convenience issue for investors. Banks are believed to be able 
to exercise a “second-degree price discrimination” of customers based on income and wealth 
by offering accounts that have different minimum balances and interest rates. Pennacchi 
(1998) points out that US mutual funds face legal constraints on the types of accounts they 
can offer, precluding clientele segmentation of this nature. However, Australian managed 
funds are allowed reserve the right to vary the fees, minimum investment amounts and other 
account operating conditions specified in the fund prospectus across customers.4  
 
Having ready access to invested monies is an important facet of the liquidity and, 
therefore, the convenience of investment products. Managed funds generally allow 
redemptions on demand, although this is generally taken to mean they will be processed 
within five working days. In addition, fund managers are allowed to withhold redemptions for 
up to sixty days depending on the cash position of the funds and market conditions. Some 
funds specifically warn that such delays may be exacerbated “if investment markets were 
disrupted or suspended”.5   
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(ii)  Safety and Price Stability 
 
Unlike in the US where deposit insurance is the major differentiating factor between 
investments held with banks and mutual fund shareholding, the absence of a deposit 
protection scheme in Australia may be taken as precluding the notion that the respective 
product classes are substitutes. However, some market participants hold the belief that the 
major banks are “too big to fail” in that the Reserve Bank of Australia cannot permit these 
banks to fail because their collapse would have devastating effects on the economy. 
Australia’s rigidly enforced competition policy that precludes mergers amongst the four 
largest banks has only served to fuel the perception of the sanctity of their guaranteed 
immunity from bankruptcy. From the perspective of this study it is instructive to note that it is 
these major banks that dominate the participation of banks in funds management business, a 
factor that may potentially exacerbate the proliferation of the belief in implied government 
protection amongst the clientele of bank-affiliated fund managers. 
 
In addition, Australian bank prudential requirements apparently imply that bank-
affiliated managed funds offer protection to their investors that exceed that of other funds.  
After analysing the portfolio composition of institutional investment managers, Del Guercio 
(1996) finds that amongst US mutual fund operators, “bank managers are more sensitive to 
prudent-man laws”.6 In the Australian context, the equivalent of prudent-man laws are the 
fiduciary responsibilities imposed on fund managers by the Managed Investments Act. It can 
be argued that over and above the due care and diligence measures imposed on fund managers 
in general, bank-affiliated fund managers are laden with additional oversight from the 
regulator of deposit-taking institutions, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA). This oversight is established by APRA’s prudential standard APS 120 (Funds 
Management and Securitisation) that “aims to ensure that ADIs adopt prudent practices to 
manage the risks arising out of their involvement in funds management and securitisation 
activities, and to ensure that appropriate capital is held against them”. The main thrust of the 
guideline is to unambiguously set funds management as an activity that is separate from the 
banking business of the institution.7 Conceivably, this separation may be taken to allow bank-
affiliated fund managers to carry out their business like any other manager without being 
curtailed by the institutional affiliation. However, when taken within the context of the 
regulator’s apparent determination to preserve the reputation of the parent bank and the 
potential capital requirements that imprudent actions within the funds management arm may 
entail, bank-owned fund managers can be construed by investors to be under pressure to 
behave somewhat more prudently than other managers. 
 
If there is downside in respect of the prudential requirements imposed on fund managers 
by virtue of their affiliation to a bank, it arises if the association hobbles the performance of 
bank-managed funds in comparison to non-bank funds. Del Guercio (1996) suggests that 
prudent-man laws may force bank-managed funds to tilt their portfolio compositions in ways 
that may, over time, explain the performance differences between them and non-bank funds. 
Koppenhaver (1999) examines money market mutual funds and, finding that funds affiliated 
with banks outperform those sponsored by other financial institutions, advances the argument 
that the abnormal performance may be due to bank expertise in dealing with money market 
securities and issuers. However, Frye (2001) explicitly tests for the existence of the 
performance discrepancy predicted by Del Guercio (2000) and, despite finding evidence of 
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more conservative investment practices by bank-managed funds, cannot observe a significant 
difference in return profiles.  
 
An aspect of investor protection in which the funds management industry is uniquely 
subject to legal uncertainty is the liability of investors. Intuitively, it would be expected that 
investors should not be personally liable in the event that a managed fund to which they 
subscribe goes insolvent and fails to meet its obligations. However, as a result of past legal 
precedent that did not fully address the issue of whether investors enjoy limited liability and 
the decision of the federal government not to clarify the situation by legislation, fund 
managers cannot explicitly guarantee their investors’ equivalence of the corporate veil8. Fund 
investor protection is governed by the Corporations Law and general law. Internally, in 
addition to the constitution which outlines the responsible entity’s fiduciary responsibilities 
and investors’ rights, the Compliance Plan, audited by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC), sets out guidelines on how the fund manager is to ensure 
compliance with the law and the fund constitution. The fund constitution generally provides 
that unit holders cannot be called upon to indemnify the responsible entity or its creditors for 
liabilities in excess of the assets of the fund. In spite of this layer of protection, it is 
conceivable that in certain instances, depending on the particular wording of the constitution, 
liability can be excluded, a possibility that has compelled ASIC to require that all 
prospectuses should carry a statement to the effect that the limited liability cannot be 
guaranteed owing to the uncertainty of the legal position9. Therefore, despite the apparent 
additional protection accorded to investors of bank-affiliated managed funds by the prudential 
requirements imposed on their parents, the enforcement of the separation dictum appears to 
decisively expose bank-managed fund investors to the same uncertainty concerning the 
liability of investors that pervades non-bank funds. When compared to investments in 
conventional bank products, this uncertainty marks a wide rift between the perceived safety of 
bank deposits, for instance, and that of managed fund offerings. 
 
An important safety attribute of investment products concerns capital guarantees that 
Australian money market oriented managed funds do not offer. Whilst some will state that 
they seek to maintain their unit price at one dollar, almost all carry disclaimers to the effect 
that investors are not guaranteed the full return of the money originally invested, as would be 
the case with a solvent bank’s savings products.10  
 
On balance, the foregoing discussion on safety and price stability appears to establish 
managed funds as being less than perfect substitutes for bank savings products in terms of 
safety and price stability. That managed funds are generally riskier than savings accounts at 
banks is perhaps emphasised by the fact that they pay higher returns, the differential 
signifying a risk premium on the former according to Pilloff (1999).11  
 
(iii)  Demand trends 
 
Finally, it is important to consider whether, on the basis of trends in the demand for 
bank liabilities and managed funds, the two respective investment avenues can be said to be 
substitutes for one another. Pilloff (1999) observes that only 5.7% of households in the US 
held money market funds compared to 84.4% that held cheque-operating or money market 
deposit accounts in 1995. Of the percentage that held MMMF investments, 98.6% also had a 
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cheque operating account or money market deposit account, a clear indication of the lack of 
substitutability between the two. This general balance is indicated for the year 1992 as well.  
 
From the Australian viewpoint, despite the trend towards increased household 
preference for market-oriented investments, the available data show a somewhat diminished 
role for traditional deposits but do not lend direct support for the idea that this has been a 
result of the shift of depositors to managed funds. Figure 2 carries two graphs of the market 
share enjoyed by bank deposits relative to cash management trusts, superannuation funds and 
unit trusts (mutual funds). Figure 2A depicts the market share in terms of economic 
importance by expressing the funds under management in the four investment classes as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product. The domineering position held by bank deposits is 
challenged by the phenomenal growth in investments held in superannuation owing largely to 
the introduction of a compulsory pension scheme with the promulgation of the 
Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act in 1992 which was projected to increase 
employer contributions alone to 9% of total income earned by 2002-3.12 Indeed 
superannuation assets rise from A$60 billion, or 14% of GDP, in 1988, to A$368 billion, 58% 
of GDP, in 2001. CMTs and unit trusts have also risen to 4% (from 1%) and 22% (from 5%) 
of GDP, respectively. In comparison, however, deposits have increased from A$123 billion, 
29% of GDP, in 1988, to A$975 billion, 69% of GDP, in 2001.  
 
Figure 2B graphs the results of adding up all the assets held in the four investment 
classes and calculating market share ratios for each based on this total. The share held by 
bank deposits has fallen from its peak of 62% in 1990 to 45% in 2001 whilst that of 
superannuation assets has risen from 27% to 38% over the same period. CMTs have increased 
their share by just a percentage point to 3% whilst unit trust assets have recovered from a 
slight fall in popularity in the mid-nineties in which they attracted 8-9% of market share to 
14% in 2001.  
 
Regarding what the trends described above represent in terms of ownership distribution, 
the dearth of data precludes an analysis over a reasonable history. Perhaps the most 
authoritative survey on this issue is the Australian Stock Exchange’s 2000 Australian 
Shareownership Study. According to this survey, 61% of adult Australians own “cash related 
products such as bank deposits”. 34% indicated they invest in fixed interest products and 22% 
in managed funds. By total funds invested, superannuation topped the list with 35%, followed 
by cash related products (20%), investment property (15%), shares (13%), fixed interest 
products (11%), managed funds (5%) and derivatives (1%).  
 
Undoubtedly the demand for alternatives to bank deposits is sizeable. Whether the 
trends that have culminated in the observed position of the alternatives in the economy, and 
the popularity and ownership distribution of financial products are indicative of a direct 
displacement of bank liabilities, in particular by products offered by banks’ own funds 
management divisions, is the empirical question the rest of this paper attempts to answer. 
  
2.2 Development of a testable model 
 
The nascent literature on the disintermediation of bank deposits in favour of managed 
funds suggests that mutual funds and bank liabilities are substitutes. Taken to its extreme, this 
prediction implies that an increase in managed fund (MF) balances should lead to a decrease 
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in bank liabilities (BL). This phenomenon could be described by the following BL to MF 
displacement ratio: 
 
BLRNMF = BLRMF + αMFRMF, (1) 
 
where BLR is the ratio of total bank liabilities to total assets defined as the assets held by the 
bank; MFR is the ratio of bank subsidiary managed fund aggregate balances to bank total 
assets; NMF and MF denote a bank without managed fund operations and one that has funds 
management operations, respectively; and α is the MF-BL substitution coefficient13. 
 
One view holds that the existence of bank-affiliated managed funds reduces the banking 
sector’s reliance on traditional liabilities, implies that α>0 and conforms to three arguments 
that correspond to α values of exactly 1; 0<α<1; and α>1. A value of 1 implies that a dollar 
of managed fund balances reduces potential bank liabilities by a dollar. Intuitively it appears 
more reasonable to assume that since a bank may rely on indirect means of offering managed-
fund-like products to its customers, such as index-linked deposits, the more likely value to be 
observed is 0<α>1. Imperfect substitution may also arise if, owing to the comparative 
illiquidity of managed fund products, savings in banking products are not reduced one-to-one 
for an increase in fund balances. Observing a value of α>1 would confirm that, indeed, banks 
are on a precipitous course towards the total delegation of the deposit-taking function to their 
managed fund operations. Complementarity between MF and BL corresponds to a negative α.  
 
Assuming that the BLR of a non-funds managing bank is a function of a number of 
control variables which reflect the characteristics that determine the banks’ BLR, then the BL 
to FM displacement ratio can be rewritten as:  
 
C (Control Variables) = BLRMF + αMFRMF = BLRNMF. (2) 
 
Rearranging the above, it follows that the MF ratio of a bank is: 
 
MFRMF = -1/αBLRMF + 1/α(Control Variables). (3) 
 
To operationalise the equation, assuming that control variables can be identified, the 
following linear model can be estimated:  
 
MFR = λ0 + λ 1(BLR) + λ i+1 (Control Variables). (4) 
 
Turning now to potential control variables, this paper adopts the following: 
 
• BL liquidity measured by the ratio of current deposits to total bank liabilities, henceforth 
denoted BLQ. This variable reflects the portion of a bank’s liabilities that can easily 
migrate to competitors or competing intra-group products. 
 
• BL size measured as the natural logarithm of total BL, denoted BLSIZE, and included 
because size may reflect the bank’s ability to attract depositors who believe in the “too-
big-to-fail” phenomenon or associate size with superior reputation. BLSIZE may also be 
partially indicative of the bank’s capacity to increase its liabilities in relation to both 
prudentially and internally-imposed capital adequacy constraints. 
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• Variability of BL calculated as the coefficient of variation of BL over the past year, 
BLVA. A recent high variability history may be associated with a bank’s instituting of 
measures to establish greater stability. 
 
• ASIC retirement savings account (RSA) approval status, assigned the dummy variable 
RSAD. This dummy variable is included since there was a strong expectation that 
retirement savings accounts would slow down the movement of savings from traditional 
deposits into managed fund products.14 As customers can maintain RSAs as part of the 
compulsory superannuation required by law, the market’s expectation that their 
introduction would slow down  the growth of other deposits would appear to contradict 
Hubbard (1986) who suggests that the liquidity constraints that characterise pension 
assets in general preclude the forced saving from displacing discretionary saving or 
encouraging increased borrowings.  
 
Having determined the potential explanatory variables for the level of managed fund 
balances preferred by a bank, the model utilised to examine the relationship between bank-
managed funds and other bank liabilities is: 
 
MFR = λ0 + λ 1(BLR) + λ2(BLVA) + λ3(BLSIZE) + λ4(BLQ) + λ5(RSAD) + ε
 (5) 
  
If MF and BL are substitutes, irrespective of the degree, α will be greater than 0 and 
consequently λ 1, the BLR coefficient, will be negative.15 
 
 
3.  Data 
 
 
In order to test the model developed in Section 2 this section utilises asset and liability 
data provided by APRA on all the banks that operated funds management entities directly 
under the banking entity, as opposed to a subsidiary in a holding company structure, and that 
were, therefore, subject to Prudential Standard APS 120.16 The APRA dataset itemises for 
each bank the different components of liabilities. This study treats the aggregation of interest 
bearing current deposits, term and call deposits, certificates of deposit and “other” liabilities 
(including statement savings, savings investment, passbook and school savings accounts) as 
the investment-type liabilities that are likely to be displaced by managed fund products. The 
liabilities that are excluded are non-interest-bearing deposits, “other borrowings” (not 
defined), bill acceptances and foreign currency liabilities. On the asset side, the APRA dataset 
distinguishes domestic from foreign currency denominated assets. This paper uses Australian 
dollar denominated assets to normalise the managed fund assets and bank investment-type 
liabilities in estimating the displacement model to avoid introducing the influence of currency 
fluctuations. 
 
Individual managed fund data were provided by ASSIRT Research, Australia’s largest 
fund ratings agency. The ASSIRT database identifies the institutional affiliation of the fund 
managers and details the total funds under management on a monthly basis for the period 
1992-2000 covered by the bank asset and liability data. As cash management trusts, the 
equivalent of the money market mutual funds studied by Pilloff (1999), account for only 3% 
of the assets under management in Australia, this study also includes cash and fixed interest 
funds. The number of the funds used in this paper increases from 89 in 1992 to 190 in 2000, 
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in tandem with the phenomenal growth in managed fund assets over the period. The funds 
represent 69% or A$29.4 billion of the A$43.3 billion in assets under management held by 
bank-affiliated funds at the end of 2000. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
 
Since the banks that form the basis of this study are easily identifiable this paper 
estimates the managed-fund – bank-liability displacement model using a sample that excludes 
banks that do not operate funds-management divisions.17 Table 1 reports the estimates 
obtained from OLS regressions of the model. Because of well-known autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems associated with models estimated with cross-sectional and time-
series data two provisions are made in coming up with the results. Firstly, to ameliorate 
autocorrelation, models are estimated for each of the years in the 1992-2000 analysis period. 
Secondly, each estimation is repeated to correct for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980) 
procedure and the results reported separately for each instance in Panels A and B of Table 1, 
respectively. Two-tailed t-Statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
The main finding of this paper is that the coefficient estimates on BLR are positive and 
highly significant in the majority of the years with the only negative coefficient being 
statistically insignificant. This result appears to rule out the substitutability of managed funds 
for bank products and is in strongly suggestive of complementarity instead. On the basis of 
this evidence, it would appear the Australian antitrust authorities are correct in maintaining 
that bank deposits and managed funds do not occupy the same market definition. 
 
Clearly, the observed complementarity is not exclusively strong. It could be conjectured 
that some substitution effects occur at the margin as a result of banks’ indirect usage of 
managed fund divisions as capital raising conduits. Prudential guidelines normally require 
banks to set aside capital against any exposure to funds management operations in a 
trusteeship or custodial role.  However, in practice, banks are known to “reclaim” the lost 
capacity to raise funds for lending via the funds management operations. For example, 
observing that financial institutions fund their loans with both equity and wholesale debt, 
primarily commercial paper, Pennacchi (1998) notes the commercial paper is sold to money 
market funds that, in turn, invite investors to open transaction accounts with them. Indeed, in 
Australia it is common for a bank-affiliated fixed interest fund, for example, to invest its 
assets in financial securities originated by, or accounts operated by, the parent bank. 
Additionally, as noted earlier in this paper, banks have been structuring index-linked products 
that would appear to be close substitutes for managed funds; however, directly investigating 
this issue is impeded by the lack of data on balances in such accounts.  
 
The coefficient on BLSIZE is negative in all the years except 1999, an indication bank 
liability size is negatively related to MFR. This is not surprising in light of anecdotal evidence 
from market commentators that the biggest banks have been generally slow in growing their 
funds management businesses, whether generic or acquisitive.18 The negative relationship 
between MFR and BLSIZE also shows that although the investment classes are 
complementary, the growth of funds under management does not play a significant role in 
increasing bank liability balances. 
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Assuming that an increased inflow of depositors’ funds into the most liquid bank 
liabilities is a proxy for a certain sentiment against long term investments amongst the suite of 
bank products, the existence of substitution effects between managed funds and bank 
liabilities could be expected to be accompanied by a positive relationship between MFR and 
the ratio of call deposits to total bank liabilities. Similarly, banks would be observed to react 
to increased volatility in liabilities with increased managed fund balances to compensate for 
the variability of its liability base. The results reflected by the BLQ coefficient are mixed, 
with positive, statistically coefficients almost being matched by negative ones. However, the 
majority of the BLVA coefficients are negative, indicating that unstable deposit balances do 
not necessarily lead banks to secure managed fund subscriptions as substitutes, further 
diminishing the substitutability argument.  
   
Retirement savings accounts are direct competitors of funds operated by the same 
banking entity. It is, therefore, not surprising that in Table 1 the RSAD dummy indicating the 
authority granted to operate the accounts is negatively related to MFR in the latter three of the 
four years that banks have been allowed to offer them. This implies that banks that offer 
retirement savings have been able to reduce their reliance on managed fund operations in their 
quest to participate in funds management activities. Whether this trend will continue is a 
subject for future research. 
 
The results in Table 1 are predominantly similar for both the heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
and non-adjusted estimates. The only difference of note is in the form of marginally lower t-
statistics for the heteroskedasticity-consistent results. The explanatory power of the 
regressions is high, as depicted by adjusted R-squared ranging from 48% to 93% on an 
increasing profile that reflects the inclusion of RSAD as an additional variable in 1997, when 
the account was first authorised, onwards.   
 
The managed fund data include wholesale (institutional) funds numbering 21in 2000 
compared to 169 retail funds. To check whether the presence of wholesale funds influences 
the results, the model is re-estimated on data that excludes the wholesale funds. The results 
are not altered in any significant way in terms of the signs, magnitude and statistical 
significance of the coefficients and are therefore not reported here. 
 
With substitution effects ruled out, it is noteworthy that treating managed funds and 
deposits as complements is costly for banks in relation to capital adequacy requirements. This 
is because banks are required to set aside capital as they increase their direct exposure to 
managed fund activities. Furthermore, there is a strong suggestion that banks may use 
managed fund operations to indirectly raise funds for the asset side of their business. 
Therefore, as a further test of the robustness of the results reported here, this study repeats the 
regressions based on the substitution model tested on data for the individual banks spanning 
1992-2000. Instead of the RSAD dummy variable, each bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR), 
reported in the annual reports, is included. If regulatory intentions that are premised on capital 
provision for incremental managed fund business taken up have a dominant effect, a negative 
relationship between MFR and CAR should be observed. 
 
The coefficient estimates for the individual bank pooled regressions are reported in 
Table 2. The number of banks is reduced to five as two of the banks were not publicly listed 
and, as such, did not report CAR histories, and CAR data on one bank is rendered noisy by its 
takeover of a large bank during the analysis period. The results decisively rule out 
substitutability as all the banks’ BLR coefficients are positive and highly statistically 
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significant. Caution should be exercised though in interpreting the high t-Statistics owing to 
the statistical problems associated with pooled panel data noted earlier on. BLQ, the measure 
of the proportion of liquid deposits held, and BLSIZE are confirmed to be negatively related to 
MFR, although the results on BLVA are still mixed. Most interestingly, as predicted, CAR is 
negatively related to MFR in all but one positive but statistically insignificant case. 
Substitutability is dominated by complementarity and bank prudential regulations 
successfully compel banks to set aside capital against managed fund exposure at the exclusion 
of most of Pennacchi’s (1998) indirect capital adequacy recoupment effects. 
 
   
5.  Conclusion 
 
 
Managed funds that are run by banks may intuitively appear to be substitutes for bank 
deposits. However, this study finds suggestive evidence that, empirically, managed fund 
assets under management and bank liability balances complement rather than displace each 
other. This corroborates descriptive evidence that the liquidity, accessibility, safety, price 
stability and popularity attributes of bank-affiliated managed funds are not, on strict analysis, 
consistent with similar characteristics of bank deposits. The complementarity is not exclusive 
though - in two out of the nine years constituting the analysis period a negative but 
statistically insignificant relationship is observed between bank liabilities and managed fund 
balance normalised by total bank assets. Some weak substitution effects may be emanating 
from such factors as the ability of bank-affiliated funds to invest in parent bank deposits, thus 
indirectly replacing the banks’ capacity to raise liabilities that is lost to prudential capital 
provisioning. To directly verify this issue, running the substitution model on individual banks 
after including the capital adequacy ratio variable shows that the measure is negatively related 
to the volume managed fund business. Prudential regulatory requirements successfully 
dissuade banks from using in-house investment management operations as an indirect conduit 
for raising funds in the same manner as deposit taking.  
 
This paper also documents a predominantly negative relationship between managed 
funds and the aggregate size of a bank’s liabilities, reflecting that despite that evidence largely 
supports complementarity, there are factors other than the existence of a managed fund 
undertaking within a banking entity that strongly influence the growth of the bank’s liabilities. 
Observed high variability in bank liabilities is negatively related to funds under management, 
negating the prediction based on the assumption of substitutability that such variability may 
induce banks to increase their reliance on managed funds for raising monies to on-lend on the 
asset side. Not surprisingly, the authorisation of banks to operate retirement savings accounts, 
that are essentially managed funds in nature and tax treatment, results in a reduced reliance on 
managed funds.  
 
The results of this paper may be instructive to bank managers, regulators and 
researchers. Banks and regulators would be right to continue to regard bank deposits and 
managed funds as belonging to different market definitions. The results also speak to the 
academic debate on financial intermediation – the empirical behaviour of bank deposits and 
managed funds suggests complementarity rather than substitutability and, as such, claims that 
the observed reduction in traditional deposit-taking business is a direct result of the advent of 
managed funds are likely premature. Bank participation in investment management activities 
is perhaps better explained by theories that acknowledge that the intermediation landscape has 
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been altered by the quest for banks to directly counter competition from such institutions as 
managed funds. 
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Notes 
 
 
1. Other reasons offered by Gallo et al (1996), quoting Kaufman and Mote (1994), for 
bank participation in mutual fund activity are 1) the deregulation of bank mutual fund 
activities past 1986; 2) the need to boost non-interest income to offset the decline in net 
interest margins, a factor linked to the decline in deposits; 3) to reduce bank 
unsystematic risk through diversification into new lines of business, citing Brewer, 
1989; 4) to lock in scale economies by adapting the existing infrastructure to mutual 
fund activities. 
 
2. See ACCC Merger Guidelines (ACCC Procedural Guidelines Series). 
 
3. See www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect . 
 
4. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s Class Order (CO 01/0050) of 
22 January 2000 allows differential fee arrangements to be negotiated separately with 
institutional (sophisticated) investors. 
 
5. For example, Australian fund managers suspended all redemptions in internationally-
oriented managed funds for ten days following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks 
on US targets. 
 
6. The so-called prudent-man rule was established in US courts in Harvard College v 
Amory where it was held that “Trustees shall act in a manner as other trustees [later 
referred to as ‘a prudent man’] would act under like circumstances”. See Del Guercio 
(1996) and Cabot (1998) for historical accounts. 
 
7. The separation concept is also associated with the authorities attempts at dealing with 
the “too big to fail” phenomenon. 
 
8. The discussion on the liability of managed fund investors in this paper is largely based 
on various submissions to the Australian Treasury in respect of the Managed 
Investments Act Review, in particular submissions by the Companies and Securities 
Advisory Committee (March 2000) and Mr D E Routley (5 September 2001), available 
online at http://miareview.treasury.gov.au . 
 
9. Specifically the legal precedent was set in JW Broomhead Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v JW 
Broomhead Pty Ltd (1985) 3 ACLC 355, 9 ACLR 593, in which the court held that the 
unit holders in a unit trust were liable to indemnify the trustee against liabilities incurred 
in carrying on a business. In this case the court applied the principle of the proportionate 
liability of trust beneficiaries. Similarly, Mcleon v Burns Philp Trustee Company Pty 
Ltd (1985) 9 ACLR 926 confirmed that the potential personal liability of trust 
beneficiaries could be limited to the extent of the assets of the trust by a clause that 
restricted the trustee’s recourse to those assets. However, such restriction would only be 
valid if it was not contrary to public policy, as was held by the court to subsist in the 
particular case. The situation is similar in the US where, under state law, the 
shareholders of a trust (fund) may, in certain circumstances generally believed to be 
remote, be held personally liable for the trust’s obligations. However, the Declaration of 
Trust disclaims liability of shareholders and the trust’s trustees and officers for acts or 
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obligations of the trust and requires that notice of such disclaimer be given in each 
agreement, obligation, or contract entered into or executed by the trust or the Board of 
Trustees. The Declaration of Trust provides for indemnification out of the assets of the 
trust of all losses and expenses of any shareholder held personally liable for the 
obligations of the trust. Thus, the risk of a shareholder incurring financial loss on 
account of shareholder liability is considered remote, since it is limited to circumstances 
in which the disclaimer is inoperative and the trust itself is unable to meet its 
obligations.  
 
10. This aspect differs from the US where a combination of established market practice and 
legislation has firmly established the maintenance of a price of one dollar on MMMFs 
as the norm. In addition private insurance schemes that guarantee investors’ capital are 
gaining in popularity. Pilloff (1999) and Farinella and Koch (1999) carry detailed 
accounts of the issues surrounding capital preservation in US MMMFs. 
 
11. A safety issue that this study does not consider owing to data limitations is that of the 
riskiness of the assets held by money-market oriented managed funds compared to 
bank-operated money market deposits. This issue is important in light of the well-
documented principal-agent problem occasioned by the asymmetric nature of the 
performance-based compensation of fund managers wherein the managers are 
incentivised to alter their preference for risk to the detriment of investors. (See, for 
example Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, and Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). 
 
12. See FSI 1997. 
 
13. The logic applied in this section is based on the non-structural model popularised by 
Ang and Peterson (1984) in the case of debt-lease substitution in firms.  
 
14. See Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (1997), page 119. The Australian Taxation Office 
definition of an RSA is an account offered by banks, building societies, credit unions, 
life insurance companies and prescribed financial institutions (RSA providers) used for 
retirement savings and similar to a superannuation fund. 
 
15. The value of λ 1, however, is a measure of the MF to BL displacement ratio rather than 
the BL to MF displacement ratio, α. Alpha cannot be determined by simply taking the 
inverse of λ 1 due to the presence of a constant and other independent variables in the 
regression model. However, should a substitutability relationship arise α can easily be 
determined by swapping the MFR and BLR in the above equation to treat the BL as the 
dependent variable, describing the following partial derivative: =∂
∂
MLR
BLR BL, MF 
displacement ratio. 
 
16. ABN-AMRO Asset Management, Advance Funds Management (acquired by St George 
Bank in 1997), ANZ Managed Investments Ltd, Barclays Global Investors, 
Commonwealth Financial Services, Macquarie Investment Management Ltd, National 
Australia Financial Management, Westpac Financial Services. 
 
17. This is useful in avoiding using a truncated dataset. 
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Fig. 1: Summary of Pilloff’s (1999) Main Findings 
 
Attribute Accounts at Insured Depository 
Institutions 
Money Market Mutual Funds 
 
A Liquidity Accessibility 
       and Convenience 
• Cheque and withdrawal 
facilities 
 
Full access  Restricted access 
• Maturity 
 
No maturity (withdrawal at any 
time) 
No maturity (withdrawal at any 
time with limited restrictions) 
• ATM, telephone and 
internet access 
Full access ATM access generally absent 
• Low account 
opening/maintenance 
balances  
Generally applicable Generally applicable 
• Convenient locations 
and access to branch 
networks 
 
Access to bank branch network Access to bank branch network 
plus advisor network 
 
B Safety and price stability 
• Federal deposit 
insurance 
Mostly applicable Not applicable 
• Diversified asset 
holdings 
Applicable to money market 
deposit accounts*  
Applicable to most products 
• Price maintained at $1 Applicable automatically Maintenance of $1 price 
sometimes requires parent 
intervention and private 
insurance 
 
 
B Demand behaviour 
• Popularity Held by majority of households Held by minority of households 
   
* Similar to and treated as deposits but invested by banks in short-term low-risk money market assets 
(Treasury bills, bank CDs, commercial paper, etc.) and usually require a minimum balance and set 
limits on the number of monthly transactions (deposits and withdrawals by cheque). 
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Fig. 2A:  Market-Share Held by Australian Fund Managers 
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Table 1: Annual OLS Coefficient Estimates of Mutual Funds–Bank 
Liabilities Substitutability 
 
PANEL A – heteroskedasticity-inconsistent results 
 
Variable 2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  
Constant 2.08  -3.49  4.27  5.86  4.79  6.15  2.95  0.97  1.56  
 (7.34) **
* 
(-7.51) **
* 
(10.89) **
* 
(6.54) **
* 
(22.12) **
* 
(5.76) **
* 
(10.56) **
* 
(4.15) **
* 
(3.02) *** 
BLR -0.21  0.22  0.18  0.22  -0.08  0.07  0.09  1.29  0.08  
 (-1.01) (1.19)  (7.28) **
* 
(6.25) **
* 
(-0.37)  (16.64) **
* 
(5.44) **
* 
(4.20) **
* 
(4.05) *** 
BLQ 2.25  12.23  0.52  -1.33  0.51  -1.41  -1.17  -2.06  1.61  
 (1.44) (11.85) **
* 
(2.07) ** (-1.21) (1.32)  (-1.40)  (-3.92) **
* 
(-2.79) **
* 
(2.62) ** 
BLSIZE -0.20  0.13  -0.39  -0.51  -0.44  -0.50  -0.23  -0.10  -0.21  
 (-6.34) **
* 
(3.07) **
* 
(-10.99) **
* 
(-6.97) **
* 
(-21.35) **
* 
(-6.00) **
* 
(-11.20) **
* 
(-5.01) **
* 
(-5.38) *** 
BLVA -0.49  5.08  -3.26  -2.26  -6.37  -8.87  -2.09  5.89  -1.54  
 (-3.21) **
* 
(12.59) **
* 
(-6.83) **
* 
(-0.95) (-14.78) **
* 
(-4.67) **
* 
(-6.63) **
* 
(6.98) **
* 
(-1.87) * 
RSAD -0.09  -0.37  -0.19  0.24  -  -  -  -  -  
 (-1.52) (-7.34) **
* 
(-2.47) ** (2.80) **
* 
-  -  -  - - 
Adjusted R2 0.75  0.93  0.75  0.72  0.87  0.78  0.65  0.64  0.48  
Number of Banks 7  7  6  6  7  7  7  7  7  
Number of Funds 190  182  160  164  149  144  129  110  89  
                   
PANEL B – White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent results 
 
Variable 2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  
Constant 2.08  -3.49  4.27  5.86  4.79  6.15  2.95  0.97  1.56  
 (4.09) **
* 
(-4.07) **
* 
(5.32) **
* 
(2.07) **
* 
(21.15) **
* 
(3.69) **
* 
(5.32) **
* 
(4.17) **
* 
(3.33) *** 
BLR -0.21  0.22  0.18  0.22  -0.08  0.07  0.09  1.29  0.08  
 (-1.17) (1.54)  (15.03) **
* 
(3.60) **
* 
(-0.45)  (4.62) **
* 
(16.73) **
* 
(4.72) **
* 
(2.05) ** 
BLQ 2.25  12.23  0.52  -1.33  0.51  -1.41  -1.17  -2.06  1.61  
 1.16 9.78 **
* 
2.03 ** -1.59 1.42  -3.12 **
* 
-3.71 **
* 
-3.27 **
* 
3.31 ** 
BLSIZE -0.20  0.13  -0.39  -0.51  -0.44  -0.50  -0.23  -0.10  -0.21  
 (-4.11) **
* 
(1.84) * (-5.74) **
* 
(-2.08) ** (-20.34) **
* 
(-3.66) **
* 
(-5.33) **
* 
(-5.38) **
* 
(-5.11) *** 
BLVA -0.49  5.08  -3.26  -2.26  -6.37  -8.87  -2.09  5.89  -1.54  
 (-1.97) * (6.81) **
* 
(-3.59) **
* 
(-0.39) (-15.59) **
* 
(-3.29) **
* 
(-3.60) **
* 
(6.49) **
* 
(-2.72) * 
RSAD -0.09  -0.37  -0.19  0.24  -  -  -  -  -  
 (-1.26) (-5.98) **
* 
(-2.20) ** (1.65) -  -  -  - - 
Adjusted R2 0.75  0.93  0.75  0.72  0.87  0.78  0.65  0.64  0.48  
Number of Banks 7  7  6  6  7  7  7  7  7  
Number of Funds 190  182  160  164  149  144  129  110  89  
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of bank-affiliated managed funds’ assets under management to total Australian-
dollar denominated bank assets. BLR is the ratio of aggregated selected investment-type bank liabilities to total Australian 
dollar denominated bank assets; BLQ is a measure of the liquidity of all bank liabilities calculated as the ratio of current 
deposits to total bank liabilities; BLSIZE is the size of the bank’s total liability exposure measured as the natural logarithm of 
total bank liabilities, BLVA is variability of bank liabilities calculated as the coefficient of variation of bank liabilities in the 
analysis year, RSAD is a dummy variable denoting whether the bank had approval to operate retirement savings accounts.  The 
expected sign for the BLR coefficient is negative if managed fund assets under management and bank investment-type 
liabilities are substitutes and positive if they are complements. Two-tailed t-statistics are in parentheses and ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2:  Pooled OLS Coefficient Estimates of Mutual Funds–Bank 
Liabilities Substitutability for Individual Banks 
 
 
Variable ANZ CBA MBL NAB WBL  
C 0.14 0.78 6.68 0.24 0.20  
 (4.68) *** (1.70) * (2.54) ** (4.45) *** (5.81) *** 
0.03 0.09 0.33 0.15 0.06  
BLR (131.74) *** (55.76) *** (2.04) ** (4.04) *** (235.48) *** 
-0.02 0.04 -0.31 -0.06 -0.03  
BLQ (-3.26) *** (0.42) (-0.50)  (-4.56) *** (-2.85) *** 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.92 -0.02 -0.01  
BLSIZE (-4.57) *** (-1.26) (-2.05 )** (-4.08) *** (-4.69) *** 
-0.03 0.49 2.10 0.01 -0.07  
BLVA (-1.91) * (3.38) *** (4.41 )*** (0.64) (-2.22) ** 
0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00  
CAR (-2.30) ** (-1.78) * (1.17)  (-2.47) ** (-4.88) *** 
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.99 0.28 0.25 0.91  
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of bank-affiliated managed funds’ assets under management 
to total Australian-dollar denominated bank assets. BLR is the ratio of aggregated selected investment-
type bank liabilities to total Australian dollar denominated bank assets; BLQ is a measure of the 
liquidity of all bank liabilities calculated as the ratio of current deposits to total bank liabilities; BLSIZE 
is the size of the bank’s total liability exposure measured as the natural logarithm of total bank 
liabilities, BLVA is variability of bank liabilities calculated as the coefficient of variation of bank 
liabilities in the analysis year, CAR is the total capital adequacy ratio for the bank.  The expected sign 
for the BLR coefficient is negative if managed fund assets under management and bank investment-
type liabilities are substitutes and positive if they are complements. Two-tailed t-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White’s correction). ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
